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questionable practice,86 and in Morlang the Fourth Circuit adhered
to this policy.
Prior to Morlang, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Lineberger,"7 had generally stated that impeachment of one's own
witness had been properly allowed in sound judicial decisions. 18 The
Morlang court, therefore, clarified the limits to which such impeach-
ment is allowable, and also outlined the scope of the court's interpre-
tation of Federal Rule of Evidence 607.89 The Fourth Circuit will thus
not allow impeachment of one's own witness in all circumstances, and
presumably, the right to impeach one's own witness under the Fed-
eral Rule is confined to the more traditional situation where counsel
is surprised by his witness' damaging testimony. What is definitely
disallowed in the Fourth Circuit is the impeaching of one's own wit-
ness merely for the purpose of getting otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence to the jury.' The court declared that while it is permissible
to impeach one's own witness in proper conditions, the practice may
not be used as a subterfuge."
FRANK F. BARR
VII. HABEAS CORPUS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Federal Habeas Corpus Relief for State Prisoners
The writ of habeas corpus' is a civil remedy2 by which those in
government custody3 may attack constitutional defects in a criminal
" See Vanston v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973); Bushaw v. United States,
353 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
' 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1060 (1972).
SId.
" See note 79 supra.
" See text accompanying note 84 supra.
" United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975).
2 Id.
The phrase "habeas corpus" used alone refers to the common law writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3042 n.6 (1976). At common
law there were several types of habeas corpus writs. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
ij *129-31.
2 Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 88 (1892). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970)
confers civil jurisdiction upon federal courts to issue the writ to state prisoners "only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States."
The government custody requirement does not necessitate actual imprisonment.
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conviction and inquire into the legality of their detention., Federal
courts have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prison-
ers upon a determination that rights guaranteed by the federal Con-
stitution have been violated.' Because federal constitutional rights
control subordinate state law, the federal judiciary has employed the
writ as a method of supervising state court administration of federally
protected rights.8
The Fourth Circuit recently decided two cases in which the peti-
tioners' adherence to procedural requirements preceded considera-
tion of the merits of the habeas corpus claims. The court of appeals
dismissed one case for petitioner's failure to exhaust his state reme-
dies.7 In the other case, the court found that the federal right upon
which the habeas corpus claim was based had not been waived earlier
in the judicial process." While both decisions were based upon appar-
ently settled law, the Supreme Court shortly thereafter significantly
changed the law concerning waiver.' In addition to procedural re-
quirements, the Fourth Circuit examined the merits of cases within
See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (constitutionality of a sentence scheduled
for future service may be challenged). Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (pris-
oner need not be incarcerated at the time his habeas corpus action arrives at final
disposition).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963).
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250 (1886). The primary objective of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction is to provide a federal forum for the vindication of federal
rights. Developments in the Law-Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1040 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Habeas Corpus]. Under the American dual judicial system,
comity requires federal deference to state court determinations. See generally Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 441 (1963). Ultimately, however, federal courts are preferable to test the constitu-
tional basis of a conviction because the federal forum permits more uniform applica-
tion of federal constitutional law to state prisoners. Habeas Corpus, supra, at 1060-62.
' The application of selected provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states has
brought much of the state criminal process under federal suprevision. Habeas Corpus,
supra note 5, at 1039. Commentators have argued that federal rights would not be
effectively protected if left solely to the state judicial system. Bator, Finality in Crimi-
nal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAIv. L. REV. 441, 521-22
(1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 430 (1961). The Supreme Court, however, is not willing
to assume that a general lack of appropriate respect for constitutional rights exists in
state courts. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051 n.35 (1976). See also Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977);
Note, Expanding Criminal Procedural Rights Under State Constitutions, 33 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 909 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 41-58 infra.
See text accompanying notes 11-39 infra.
See text accompanying notes 30-39 infra.
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the traditional substantive scope of habeas corpus. However, the
Supreme Court's restriction of habeas corpus in- search and seizure
cases may subsequently limit the Fourth Circuit's review of that
ground for relief.'0
Although state noncompliance with federal constitutional rights
in criminal proceedings generally provides grounds for granting fed-
eral habeas corpus relief," federal courts may refuse to review the
merits of a state conviction if the petitioner waived his constitutional
rights through a procedural default 2 or a deliberate bypass of state
20 Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); see text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
" See generally Habeas Corpus, supra note 5.
2 A state prisoner failing to make a timely challenge to the composition of the
grand jury has been barred from habeas corpus relief because of this procedural de-
fault. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). See text accompanying notes 36-39
infra. The Supreme Court has defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). In accordance with the Johnson standard, a petitioner enjoys "every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at 464. See Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (clarifying the Johnson standard in the context of
habeas corpus litigation). The Fay Court, in stressing the importance of the defen-
dant's participation with counsel in waiving his rights, made no distinction among pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial waivers, implying that the same waiver standard should be
applied throughout. Id. at 439. Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of
Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
1262, 1273 (1966).
In Blake v. McKenzie, Civ. No. 76-1322 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1976), disposition
recorded 535 F.2d 1349, the Fourth Circuit held that when the defendant had failed to
assert three specific claims in his four previous habeas corpus petitions, there could
be no finding of waiver absent evidence that the failure to assert the claims was
deliberate. The reasoning of the court focused upon the principle that mere failure to
raise a claim may not be construed as a deliberate waiver absent additional evidence.
Id. at 3, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Hunt v. Warden, 335 F.2d
936 (4th Cir. 1964).
While the decision in Blake was based on waiver, principles of finality might have
been considered to bar the petition. Principles of finality were initially developed by
the courts because at common law habeas corpus judgments were not appealable. Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924). The
principles of finality have been codified as the "identical ground" and "abuse of
remedy" rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1970). See generally Note, Amendment of 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (1964), 45 TEx. L. Rav. 592 (1967). A petitioner usually would be
barred from presenting a subsequent petition if he has "abused" the privilege of the
writ by needlessly splitting his claims between two federal petitions. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963). See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 287-93 (1948);
FED. R. HABEAs CoRPus 9(a)(b), effective Feb. 1, 1977.
The "abuse of remedy" ground, as an alternative to the Fourth Circuit disposition
of Blake in terms of waiver, may be more appropriate. While it developed as a principle
of finality, the waiver standard has been utilized to protect an individual's constitu-
tional rights. Because the petitioner in Blake had petitioned the court four times,
1977]
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procedure. 3 The waiver issue often creates friction between state pro-
cedural requirements for the presentation of substantive issues and
the federal obligation to insure defendants their constitutional pro-
tections. 4 The Supreme Court has indicated that federal habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction is not necessarily precluded by the defendant's proce-
dural defaults in the state criminal trial. 15 However, when the proce-
dural default constitutes a deliberate bypass of state procedures, the
Supreme Court has provided that federal courts may exercise discre-
tion to deny habeas relief."
The Fourth Circuit in Resendez v. Garrison7 considered whether
an accused had waived his federal claims by deliberately bypassing
state procedures. Defendant Resendez was convicted of felony mur-
der and kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the
time of his conviction, North Carolina juries possessed absolute dis-
cretion in capital cases to decide whether a defendant received a life
sentence or the death penalty." Resendez and his attorneys decided
not to appeal the conviction because of the possibility that a new trial
might result in a death sentence. The court considered whether the
petitioner's decision to forego appeal upon the advice of counsel con-
finality would seem to be the more appropriate consideration.
'3 A deliberate bypass may be found if a habeas applicant, after consultation with
counsel, knowingly relinquished the privilege of asserting a claim. Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
11 See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 441 (1963).
11 Federal courts may find that a deliberate bypass acts as a binding waiver of the
petitioner's constitutional claim when he has voluntarily and intelligently foregone
state procedure. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by
anything that may occur in the state proceedings. 1d. at 426-27. In light of Stone v.
Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), this is no longer true with respect to full state adjudica-
tion of a search and seizure claim. See text accompanying notes 62-76 infra. By com-
mitting a procedural default, a defendant may be barred from challenging his convic-
tion in the state courts, even upon federal constitutional grounds. However, forfeiture
of remedies does not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which his conviction
was procured. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427-28 (1963).
11 372 U.S. at 438.
17 528 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 1976) (No. 76-301).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1969), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum.
Supp. 1975). The former statute imposed the death penalty, but the jury could give
life imprisonment in lieu of death. The 1973 amendment deleted the proviso authoriz-
ing the jury to recommend life imprisonment. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct.
2978 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the North Carolina statute imposing a
mandatory death sentence for first-degree murder violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 2990.
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stituted deliberate bypass of his state remedies. The Resendez court
held that the intelligent and rational choice of the defendant not to
appeal was not the kind of deliberate bypass that would preclude
legitimate constitutional assertion of the claim in federal court."
The Fourth Circuit based its decision upon the factual similarity
of the defendant's situation to that in Fay v.Noia.' In Fay, although
the defendant had intentionally chosen not to appeal, the Supreme
Court held that no binding waiver existed because the decision was
forced upon him by the "grisly choice"'" between accepting an uncon-
stitutionally obtained conviction or appealing that conviction with
the possibility of a death sentence upon retrial. Relying upon Fay,
the Fourth Circuit in Resendez recognized that while the defendant's
decision to forego appeal was deliberate in that it was intentional, it
was not deliberate in the sense of being "merely tactical or stra-
tegic.
23
1, 528 F.2d at 1311. The Fourth Circuit noted that in Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d
663 (4th Cir. 1963), a defendant's failure to appeal his first degree murder conviction
following a recommendation of life imprisonment by the jury was held not to be a
deliberate bypass. Id. at 669. In Wilson, defendant's attorney counselled him that upon
a successful appeal and retrial he would face either a possible death penalty if found
guilty or commitment to the state mental asylum if his insanity defense prevailed. Id.
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
21 Id. at 440. The common threat in both Fay and Resendez was the pressure of
the decision between permitting a constitutionally defective conviction to stand, or
appealing with the possibility of a capital sentence. Resendez v. Garrison, 528 F.2d
1310, 1311 (4th Cir. 1975).
21 The possibility of a harsher sentence on retrial was especially acute because the
sentencing judge was not bound to accept the jury's recommendation of a life sentence.
Furthermore, the judge had made certain harsh remarks to the defendant. 372 U.S. at
397.
After formulating the deliberate bypass standard, the Fay majority held that
petitioner's failure to appeal, although intentional, was not a deliberate circumvention
of state procedure because exceptional circumstances had forced him to make the
"grisly choice." Id. at 438. On the other hand, the decision also held that federal courts
had the power to overlook the state procedural default. Id. at 422, 426. The Supreme
Court stated that although Noia actually had waived access to the state appellate
process, a federal court could refuse "to concede jurisdictional significance to the
abortive state court proceeding," id. at 426, and thereby render the prior waiver inef-
fective in the habeas hearing. The first approach denies the existence of a waiver, while
the latter rationale is based upon the federal courts' discretionary power to overlook
what otherwise would have been an effective waiver. The better approach is to recog-
nize the effective waiver while at the same time affirming the court's discretionary
power to overlook it when the defendant is forced to make such a choice of evils.
Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Compe-
tence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262, 1291 n.198 (1966). See Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
2 Resendez v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 1310, 1311 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit
1977]
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Although a defendant's decision between two distasteful alterna-
tives may satisfy the knowing, intelligent, and deliberate bypass
standard of Fay, 4 the position of having to make such a choice may
constitute sufficiently exceptional circumstances to vitiate the
waiver.2 Notwithstanding the narrowness of the "grisly choice" ex-
ception 26 and the Supreme Court's recent finding of waiver by proce-
dural default,u the exception may still have considerable merit and
continuing validity in providing the courts with flexibility and en-
couraging compliance with state procedure.
29
When the Fourth Circuit again approaches the question of waiver,
however, it will confront recent significant changes by the Supreme
Court in the waiver standard. In Estelle v. Williams," the Court held
that although the state cannot compel an accused to stand trial be-
fore a jury while in prison garb, the defendant's failure to make a
timely objection at trial was sufficient evidence upon which to infer
a waiver.3 ' Moreover, defendant's failure to object negated the pres-
noted without elaboration that the Supreme Court had held that the motivation be-
hind the criminal defendant's decision determines whether he has engaged in a deliber-
ate bypass, possibly foreclosing his federal remedy. The Resendez holding was based
upon this language in Fay v. Noia which acted as the test for a deliberate bypass: "If
a habeas applicant. . . understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seek-
ing to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical,
or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state
procedures. . 372 U.S. at 439. Resendez v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 1310, 1311 (4th Cir.
1975).
11 372 U.S. at 439. See note 12 supra.
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963).
Z Id. at 440. See also Habeas Corpus, supra note 5, at 1108. Cf., Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 29 (1973).
2' See text accompanying notes 30-39 infra.
Compare Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 931 (1964); and Mirra v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) with
Aaron v. Capps, 507 F.2d 685 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); and Winters
v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Haywood, 360 F. Supp.
956 (D.D.C. 1973); and United States ex rel. Schaedel v. Follette, 275 F. Supp. 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd 447 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1971).
" Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Participation, Com-
petence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262, 1292 (1966).
- 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
" No objection was made to the trial judge concerning the jail attire either before
or during the trial. At the pre-trial evidentiary hearing, defense counsel did not suggest
that he feared any adverse consequences accompanying an objection. In addition,
defense counsel was free to have the judge cure the defect without fear of aggravating
him. At trial, defense counsel expressly referred to respondent's attire during voir dire.
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court thought the trial judge might reasona-
bly have assumed that failure to object was a deliberate approach to elicit jury sympa-
thy. 425 U.S. 501, 510-12 (1976).
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ence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional viola-
tion. 2 While the Court had previously indicated disfavor with in-
ferred waivers of constitutional rights," the Estelle Court would not
extend that policy of allowing defense counsel deliberately to forego
objection to curable trial defects merely because he thought objection
would be futile.34 The Estelle view of waiver changed the test from a
knowing, intelligent and deliberate act by the defendant as in Fay,
to whether the state's activity has precipitated a waiver by compul-
sion.3
In Francis v. Henderson,3 the Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner who had failed to make a timely challenge to the composi-
tion of the grand jury which indicted him could not initiate a post-
conviction challenge to the grand jury five years later in a federal
habeas proceeding. 7 Francis thus established a technical forfeiture
unless the petitioner can show both good cause for his failure to
challenge and also that he suffered actual prejudice.3 8 The Court's
decision further restricted the expansive federal habeas corpus juris-
diction outlined by Fay. In addition, it undermined the principle that
a defendant's procedural default will bar relief only if it was a deliber-
ate bypass.39 Because the Fourth Circuit followed the Fay approach
2 Id.
" See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
11 The majority in Estelle felt that a finding of no inferred waiver might impose a
burden on the trial judge to elicit an affirmative waiver. 425 U.S. at 512. Additionally,
defense counsel was aware of the factual and legal basis for an objection. Id. at 510.
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan asserted that the Court, for the first time, defined the waiver of a right that
radically affects due process in terms of state compulsion rather than in terms of an
individual's affirmative relinquishment of that right. Id. at 516. The significance of this
change is that it might replace the Johnson waiver standard. Id. at 521-23. But see
425 U.S. at 508 n.3. Justice Brennan argued that this factual situation should have
been resolved solely under the Johnson test. Id. at 516. Likewise, Justice Brennan
feared that by defining the due process right in prison garb cases in terms of state
compulsion, the Court opened the door for the complete abandonment of the Johnson
waiver doctrine. Id. at 523 n.6.
31 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
1 Id. The Francis decision extended the holding of Davis v. United States, 411
U.S. 233 (1973), to a request that a federal court overturn a state conviction because
of an allegedly unconstitutional grand jury indictment. In Davis, the Court concluded
that petitioner had waived his claim of discriminatory jury composition when he failed
to attack the composition, and three years had passed since his conviction in federal
court. But see McNeil v. North Carolina, 368 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1966); Guzewicz v.
Slayton, 366 F. Supp. 1402 (E.D. Va. 1973); Hairston v. Cox, 361 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D.
Va. 1973), aff'd 500 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1974).
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976).
' Brief for Petitioner, at 24-27; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976)
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avoiding the technical forfeiture of claims through procedural de-
fault, there necessarily will be new examination of the waiver ques-
tion involving the Estelle and Francis rationale that under certain
circumstances a defendant's waiver is manifested by inaction.
In addition to waiver by deliberate bypass, federal courts tradi-
tionally have refused to grant habeas corpus relief to defendants who
have failed to exhaust all remedies available in state courts."0 In
Durkin v. Davis,4' the Fourth Circuit remanded the habeas corpus
petition with directions to dismiss the petition without prejudice for
failure to exhaust state remedies.2 The rationale behind the exhaus-
tion rule is to avoid upsetting convictions without first permitting the
states an opportunity to correct constitutional defects. 3 Federal
courts examine the current availability of state remedies to deter-
mine whether they have been exhausted. The rule of exhaustion, now
codified in the federal habeas corpus statute,44 is rooted in considera-
tions of federal-state comity."
The petitioner in Durkin was convicted in state court of robbery,
abduction and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and sentenced to
forty years in prison. Unable to post bond, he spent sixteen months
in jail while awaiting his trial and pending his appeal. Thereafter, he
escaped and was re-apprehended.46 The trial court decided that the
defendant was not entitled to credit for the period of confinement
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d
663 (4th Cir. 1967). In Fay v. Noia, the Court stated that "federal constitutional rights
of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review." 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 271-72 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
10 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
" 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'g 390 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1975).
12 538 F.2d at 1042.
" Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1975); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). Section 2254(b) provides that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus will not be granted unless state judicial remedies have been exhausted
or the available state remedies are inadequate. The exhaustion requirement is further
qualified by the provision that a person must raise his complaint within the state "by
any available procedure" before seeking to enter federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)
(1970). See also FED. R. HABEAS CORPUS 4-5, effective Feb. 1, 1977.
'" The doctrine of comity requires federal court deference to the state court until
the latter has passed on the matter. However, the federal court, while deferring, still
has concurrent jurisdiction with the state court. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20
(1963), quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). Applying Fay, the Fourth
Circuit has held that exhaustion is a doctrine of comity, not a definition of power. Hunt
v. Warden, 335 F.2d 936, 940 (4th Cir. 1964).
" 538 F.2d at 1038-39.
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prior to his escape.4 7 Upon defendant's petition for habeas corpus
relief, the district court restored his pre-escape jail time. The Fourth
Circuit found it difficult to fault the district court's rationale that
summary deprivation of defendant's sentence credit infringed upon
his constitutional rights. 8 Nevertheless, the Durkin court refused to
sustain the writ because petitioner had failed to pursue his state
habeas corpus remedy." The court of appeals reasoned that the power
behind the exhaustion requirement rests not only upon principles of
comity,"0 but also upon the positive command of the statute itself.5'
The Fourth Circuit applied the exhaustion requirement unme-
chanically and indicated that it would be inclined to resolve any
doubt about exhaustion in favor of the petitioner if allowing the jail
time credit would permit immediate consideration of his release or
parole.52 This statement by the court of appeals followed prior cases
in which the exhaustion requirement was satisfied although some
state remedies were, in fact, still available.5 3 These findings indicate
that direct state appellate remedies, rather than state collateral rem-
edies, are more important in vindicating the interests underlying the
'1 Id. at 1039. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-208 (1950) provides that any person sentenced
to confinement under the criminal laws shall have all time actually spent in jail
credited toward satisfaction of his sentence. The statute limits credit so that "[n]o
such credit .... shall be given to any person who shall break jail or make an escape."
538 F.2d at 1038.
" The district court held that summary deprivation of pre-conviction and post-
conviction confinement credit upon sentence, by operation of the Virginia statute,
infringed upon the prisoner's fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights. Durkin
v. Davis, 390 F. Supp. 249, 255 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1976).
11 Although petitioner had been denied a writ of mandamus in state court, he still
could have sought relief by habeas corpus in state court. 538 F.2d at 1042.
" If the state court had denied the writ of mandamus on jurisdictional grounds,
then the federal court should have deferred to the state court until the latter had
reached the merits of the petitioner's claim. See id. at 1042. Exhaustion preserves the
role of the state courts in the application of federal laws and rights. Habeas Corpus,
supra note 5, at 1094.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). See note 44 supra.
52 538 F.2d at 1042.
The Fourth Circuit has stated a general rule that after issues have been properly
presented to the state's highest court on direct review, a federal habeas petitioner may
be deemed to have fully complied with the exhaustion requirement. It is not necessary
to urge a question upon the state court a second time. Thompson v. Peyton, 406 F.2d
473 (4th Cir. 1968); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960). Crawford
v. Cox, 307 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Va. 1969). Accord, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-
50 (1953). See also Jenkins v. Fitzberger, 440 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1971) (when state
prosecuting authorities request that a federal court hear a case, the federal court may
properly exercise jurisdiction).
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exhaustion rule and in fulfilling its major function." Once state ap-
pellate remedies have been exhausted, further state collateral reme-
dies need not necessarily be pursued. The few exceptions to the ex-
haustion requirement found by the Fourth Circuit do not undermine
the general function of the exhaustion rule because the number of
claims directed to the state courts prior to petitioning for the federal
habeas corpus writ is not reduced by these exceptions."
The Fourth Circuit also has heard claims absent exhaustion of
state remedies if the claims are patently frivolous.5" The rationale for
reaching the merits of frivolous claims is that exhaustion does not
require an exercise in futility.57 In such cases, dismissal for failure to
exhaust state remedies would waste valuable state and judicial
time.5
The procedural requirements that affect the issuance of habeas
corpus relief in the Fourth Circuit serve to regulate the court's discre-
tion in handling a petitioner's constitutional claims. Moreover, a
waiver bar to the assertion of a claim and the exhaustion requirement
serve the state's interests in adjudicating state prisoner claims and
structuring the orderly pursuit of habeas corpus relief within the
framework of both federal and state judicial processes. Procedural
limitations on the use of habeas corpus and the validity of the sub-
stantive claims for such relief affect the granting of the habeas corpus
remedy. The grounds upon which the Fourth Circuit has granted
relief in recent cases have included constitutional defects in search
and seizure, 5 discrimination in the jury selection process,"0 and viola-
" State appellate processes are most important in vindicating the interests under-
lying the exhaustion rule because they provide the higher state courts an opportunity
to supervise trial courts and to facilitate uniform application of the law. Habeas Cor-
pus, supra note 5, at 1095.
Id. at 1102-03.
See, e.g., Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 922 (1973); Thomas v. Muncy, 408 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Va. 1976). See
also Russell v. Missouri, 511 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v. North Carolina,
471 F.2d 406, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1973).
11 See, e.g., Ham v. NorthCarolina, 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Woodall v.
Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
1" Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1974); Hensley v. Municipal Court,
411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973) ("The demand for speed, flexibility, and simplicity is clearly
evident in our decisions concerning the exhaustion doctrine .... ") (citations omit-
ted). See, e.g., Webb v. Peyton, 345 F.2d 521, 522 (4th Cir. 1965); Thomas v. Muncy,
408 F. Supp. 734, 736 (W.D. Va. 1976). For a discussion of exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement, see Habeas Corpus, supra note 5, at 1093-1103.
' See text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
U See text accompanying notes 77-103 infra.
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tion of the defendant's right to counsel.'
The Fourth Circuit in Campbell v. Superintendent" examined
petitioner's claim that evidence seized from an automobile subse-
quent to an arrest was made without probable cause and thus was
improperly admitted at trial in violation of the fourth amendment.
Virginia police officers knew only three relevant facts: that the defen-
dant and two companions had rented a motel room near the scene of
the robbery, that they were driving a certain vehicle with out-of-state
license plates, and that they had vacated the motel room after the
crime." Maryland police, relying upon this information provided
from a police bulletin, arrested the petitioner although, neither an
arrest warrant nor a search warrant had been obtained in Maryland
or Virginia.64 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's
decision in Whiteley v. Warden5 indicated that the officers did-not
have probable cause to arrest the petitioner, thereby rendering the
arrest unconstitutional."6 The court therefore held that the evidence
secured by the search incident to that unlawful arrest should have
been excluded from Campbell's trial.6
7
While the Fourth Circuit based its decision in Campbell upon
settled law, the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state convic-
tions has been significantly altered by the Supreme Court decision
in Stone v. Powell.8 In Stone, the Court held that when the state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amend-
ment claim, the federal constitution does not require that a state
prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief." Stone does not
" See text accompanying notes 103-117 infra.
Campbell v. Superintendent, Civ. No. 76-1533 (4th Cir. May 24, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 323, petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Aug.
20, 1976) (No. 76-256).
0 Campbell v. Superintendent, No. 76-1533, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. May 24, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 323.
" Id. at 4.
U 401 U.S. 560 (1971). In Whiteley, the Court found that the arrest warrant con-
tained only the conclusory allegations of a sheriff's complaint based upon an informer's
tip. Police reliance on such a warrant in order to arrest and conduct a full search
incident to the arrest was improper because there was insufficient probable cause for
issuance of the warrant. Id. at 568-69.
" Campbell v. Superintendent, No. 76-1533, slip op. at 5-7 (4th Cir. May 24,
1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 323.
Id. at 7.
U 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). See McFeely, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From
Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 533, 556-60 (1976); Note, The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule in Federal Habeas Corpus, 37 LA. L. REv. 289 (1976).
" 96 S. Ct. at 3052.
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purport to narrow the exclusionary rule itself,7" but only the circum-
stances under which a petitioner may claim the necessity of its appli-
cation upon collateral review.7 While noting in Stone that the exclu-
sionary rule was justified by the belief that exclusion of evidence
would deter unlawful police conduct," the Court adhered to the view
that the additional deterrent effects of exclusion are not appreciably
increased upon collateral review when claims have already been fully
adjudicated in state courts.
7 3
The primary question for review of a habeas corpus petition in
post-Stone cases will be whether petitioner was provided a fair oppor-
tunity to raise the search and seizure claim and have it fully adjudi-
cated in state court proceedings.74 The Fourth Circuit summarily
applied the proscription of Stone in Fankboner v. Paderick,75 revers-
The majority did not address the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should
be eliminated. See id. at 3046 n.17. But see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3055 (1976)
(Burger, C. J., concurring). Cf., United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976) (exclu-
sionary rule was not extended to a federal civil tax proceeding where evidence was
obtained by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a warrant
later proved defective and no proof existed of any federal participation in the illegal-
ity).
i) The Stone Cdurt was concerned merely that the general administration of the
exclusionary rule would remain with the state courts. The states must provide a "full
and fair litigation" of the fourth amendment claim, 96 S. Ct. at 3046-49. See Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
U The Court in Stone indicated that while the majority in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), justified the application of the exclusionary rule to the states on several
grounds, 367 U.S. at 656-59, its principal justification was the belief that exclusion
would deter unlawful police conduct. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047 (1976).
U 96 S. Ct. at 3050-51. The Court noted that the exclusionary rule deters unlawful
police conduct when applied to the trial and direct-appeal stages. Despite the broad
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Court has never interpreted it to pro-
scribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings. Id. at 3047-49.
See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
1, A number of federal courts have applied Stone retroactively, holding that no
federal habeas corpus relief can be considered for state prisoners' fourth amendment
claims if fully and fairly litigated in state courts. Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th
Cir. 1976); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976); Poindexter v. Wolff,
540 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1976); Fankboner v. Paderick, Civ. No. 75-1502 (4th Cir. Aug.
4, 1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 324; George v. Blackwell, 537 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1976). Stone v. Powell enunciated no new formulation of the exclusionary rule. Rather,
the Court held that the purposes of that rule are not served by allowing one who has
fully and fairly litigated a fourth amendment claim in a state court to reargue the
question in a federal habeas corpus action. No police conduct heretofore unlawful was
legitimated. Id. at 3050-51. But see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3055-71 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
11 Fankboner v. Paderick, No. 75-1502 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 1976), disposition recorded
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ing the grant of habeas relief by a district court preceding Stone. In
order for the writ to issue, the Fourth Circuit will have to find that
the petitioner was denied a full and fair hearing at the state level
upon facts similar to Campbell."5
In addition to claims of an illegal search and seizure, habeas cor-
pus relief has been appropriate for evaluating the substantive claim
of discrimination in the jury selection process.7 Jury discrimination
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment." For almost a century the Supreme Court has
held that a conviction cannot stand if based upon an indictment or
verdict by juries from which blacks were excluded.7 However, a de-
538 F.2d 324. In a per curiam opinion, the court stated merely that the state court had
conducted a full hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress evidence.
"' The Supreme Court in Stone left unanswered the question of what constitutes
a full and fair hearing on the search and seizure claim and by what criteria it will be
judged. A number of federal courts have reviewed state court records to ensure that
claims have been heard, but have offered no dicussion of the factors in their analysis.
See cases cited in note 74 supra. However, the Second Circuit in Gates v. Henderson,
Civ. No. 76-2065 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977), recently held that a footnote in Stone, 96 S.
Ct. 3037, 3052 n.36, indicates that Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) is relevant
to the question whether an adequate opportunity has been provided, "although the 'cf.'
signal preceding the citation makes its exact meaning uncertain .... " Gates v.
Henderson, slip op. at 1353. The Gates court pointed out that Townsend listed six
situations in which the inadequate state factfinding would entitle a habeas petitioner
to a federal evidentiary hearing. Gates v. Henderson, slip op. at 1353-55. The six
situations are: 1. Where the state court has not made adequate factual or legal findings
to support its conclusion, 372 U.S. at 313-16; 2. Where the state factual determinations
are "not fairly supported by the record," id. at 316; 3. Where "serious procedural
errors" have been employed in the factfinding process, id.; 4. Where newly discovered
evidence bearing upon the constitutionality of the detention is alleged in a habeas
application, id. at 317; 5. Where "evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the
constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing," unless there was "inex-
cusable" default under Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 301, 438 (1963), 372 U.S. at 317; and 6.
Where-open-endedly-"the state court has not after a full hearing reliably found the
relevant facts," id. at 318.
7 Where the petitioner has been convicted by a jury from which blacks have been
systematically excluded because of their race, he is entitled to be released from custody
on habeas corpus. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1953).
71 See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549 (1967); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
" Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879); Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973). However, such a claim must be
timely raised. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. In addition, where a state
criminal defendant pleads guilty on advice of counsel, he cannot in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights that antedated the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); see
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); but see Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S.
283 (1975).
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fendant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition as long
as the selection process which produced the jury did not systemati-
cally operate to exclude a distinctive group present within the com-
munity." The Supreme Court has never announced a mathematical
standard for demonstrating "systematic exclusion;" instead, it has
inquired into the facts of each case.8 1 In providing habeas corpus relief
in Spratley v. Paderick,8 the Fourth Circuit meticulously examined
the state record and found prima facie evidence of racial discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process.
In Spratley, a Virginia jury convicted the petitioner, a black, of
attempted rape. He sought federal habeas corpus relief from a life
sentence, claiming that he was convicted by a jury selected in a
racially discriminatory manner, but the district court denied the peti-
tion.813 The Fourth Circuit examined the record from the state court
hearing and found a significant disparity between the proportion of
blacks eligible for jury service, approximately 44%, and the propor-
tion on the master jury list, 16% . 4 Because this statistical finding was
coupled with a showing that the selection process itself presented an
opportunity for jury discrimination, the court found a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Grech v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d
747 (5th Cir. 1974).
" See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). In addition, the Constitution
forbids not only the exclusion of blacks but discrimination in the form of token inclu-
sion of blacks on juries. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 206 (1965); See also
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967); Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d 657, 659 (4th
Cir. 1971); Witcher v. Peyton, 382 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1967). The prima facie case is
not destroyed by the token inclusion of blacks on the jury panel, see Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953), nor by the fact that the jury commissioners placed on the rolls
only those persons with whom they were personally acquainted. Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950).
82 528 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 734.
" The record from the state hearing revealed that in Isle of Wight County, 46.4%
of the presumptively eligible voters in the 1960 census were blacks and that in the 1970
census 42.6% of them were black. In 1965 and the preceding four years, however, the
percentage of blacks on the master jury list ranged from a low of 11.7% to a high of
21.4%. Id. at 734.
8 Id. Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994
(1974); Blackwell v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1973); Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d
657 (4th Cir. 1971). The showing in Spratley differs in one respect from that in
Stephens. In Stephens, the petitioner presented statistical evidence concerning the
representation of blacks on venires in addition to their representation on the master
list. Nevertheless, the Spratley court did not find the difference crucial because the
random selection of venires from the box was not susceptible to weighting in favor of
one race. After the selection of a number of venires, presumably the proportion of
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missal of the petition but noted that the showing of discrimination
was not conclusive. The case was remanded for a hearing to afford
the Commonwealth of Virginia an opportunity to rebut the prima
facie case.8
The burden of establishing a pattern of exclusion from jury selec-
tion rests upon the petitioner. 7 The Spratley court found that a
prima facie case of discrimination was established by the opportunity
for discrimination in the formulation of a master jury list"s and the
disparate percentages between the black population and black repre-
sentation on the master list.81 In Spratley, white jury commissioners
selected only individuals whom they knew for the jury master list."
Although there are several methods of demonstrating a prima facie
case of jury discrimination,"' proof that the selection process discrimi-
nates against a cognizable class92 and that the discrimination is occa-
sioned by the selection process are two essential elements. 3
The Fourth Circuit consistently has subscribed to the view that
mere statistical evidence of discrimination is insufficient proof absent
additional positive indicia of discrimination or a showing that a pro-
cedure either discriminates on its face or was administered so as to
effect discrimination. 4 In contrast, a number of circuits have held
blacks on all venires approximated the proportion on the master list. Spratley v.
Paderick, 528 F.2d 733, 734 (1975).
" Id. at 735. Prima facie evidence raises only a presumption of discrimination.
Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1971). The state, however, may show that the
disparities can be explained by factors other than discrimination. 528 F.2d at 735.
' See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972).
" 538 F.2d at 734. Each year the jury commissioners selected names for the master
jury list, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-182 (1950) (repealed 1973). The commissioners were
required to select persons of "good repute for intelligence and honesty." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-181 (1950) (repealed 1973). The state conceded that to make such a choice, a
commissioner must personally know the individual. 528 F.2d at 734. Therefore, white
jury commissioners could fail to search out qualified blacks.
" See note 84 supra.
" See note 88 supra.
" See generally Comment, The Civil Petitioner's Right to Representative Grand
Juries and A Statistical Method of Showing DiscriminatiQn in Jury Selection Cases
Generally, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 581 (1973).
," Cognizability denotes that a group exists subject to community prejudice as a
distinct class. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
93 See generally Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 834-35 App. (5th Cir. 1975).
"1 See, e.g., Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 274 (3d Cir. 1972) ("key man" sys-
tem-strategically located persons n the county suggested capable people for jury
duty); Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929
(1972) ("clear thinking" test used to select master jury panel was culturally biased);
Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d 657, 659 (4th Cir. 1971) (primary source of jurors was a
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that statistics alone are sufficient to establish a prima facie case.,'
Because all of the successful challenges to selection systems in the
Supreme Court have been based upon evidence of total exclusion or
statistical disparities coupled with a prima facie opportunity to
discriminate, the Court has provided very little guidance on the suffi-
ciency of proof.9
The Spratley court relied upon the demonstration that an extreme
difference existed between the proportion of blacks selected for jury
service and the proportion of blacks within the general voter popula-
tion. 7 Although the showing of such a striking disparity is regarded
as the crucial aspect of the prima facie test, any attempt to discern
a minimum standard of disparity would be difficult. 8 The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that a two-to-one disparity between those
blacks presumptivly eligible for jury service and those actually on the
master list was an appropriate threshold for establishing convincing
proof of discrimination.
The contrast between the proportion of blacks in the population
eligible for jury service and the proportion of blacks on the master list
racially designated poll tax list); Black v. Curb, 422 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1970) (discrimi-
nation in making up jury roll).
," Gibson v. Blair, 467 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hyde, 448
F.2d 815, 825 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972) (where there is com-
plete absence or "spectacular" underrepresentation of blacks on juries, a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination is established-dictum); United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) (significant disparity raises the inference of discrimi-
nation that the state must dispel). The view that statistics alone are sufficient to
establish a prima facie case may be justified by the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972). In Alexander, the Court did not
preclude the possibility that evidence of a "progressive decimation" of potential black
grand jurors could establish a prima facie case. Instead, in the face of proof that an
opportunity to discriminate clearly existed, the Court chose not to rely solely on the
statistics which evidenced discrimination. Id. at 630.
" E.g., Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (the opportunity to discriminate was
found where the source of jury venire selection, local tax digests, was maintained on a
segregated basis). Accord, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
11 528 F.2d at 734. In using statistics as an aspect of the prima facie test, courts
have relied heavily upon an "intuitive and untutored understanding of the laws of
chance." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 255
(1968). Once sufficiently convincing statistical evidence has been presented, a court
may infer that "[c]hance and accident alone, could hardly have brought about the
[exclusion] ...... Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940). See also Finklestein,
The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80
HARv. L. REv. 338, 374 (1967).
gR See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967).
" Spratley v. Paderick, 528 F.2d 733, 734 (1975); Stephens v. Cox, 449 F.2d 657,
659 (4th Cir. 1971).
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may be evaluated in absolute or comparative terms. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has employed the less preferable comparative approach by ac-
knowledging a two-to-one disparity between those presumptively eli-
gible for jury service and the proportion of blacks on the master list. 11
The preferable view is that an absolute measure should be em-
ployed' because the comparative measure may distort the signifi-
cance of the disparity where blacks compose a very small percentage
of the population. 02 In order to refine judicial analysis of statistical
disparity, additional categories of comparison utilized by other
courts"3 should be employed by the Fourth Circuit.
In addition to considering a case of discriminatory jury selection,
the Fourth Circuit has considered whether a suspect's right to request
counsel and to halt immediate interrogation prevents the police from
11 For example, the Fourth Circuit has employed the comparative view by charac-
terizing the contrast between a 34% black composition of the total population and
14.6% and 15.74% appearance of blacks on juries as 2:1 rather than a difference in
absolute terms of 15%.
" Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 834-35 App. (5th Cir. 1975). See also Smith v.
Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 279 n.19 (3d Cir. 1972).
"02 See, e.g., United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 990 (1974). The court held that while the comparative index may be proper where
blacks constitute a significant proportion of the population, it is ordinarily inappro-
priate where a very small proportion of the population is black. Id. at 1249.
113 Need exists for "compartmentalizing" data at different stages in the jury selec-
tion process. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 835-36 App. (5th Cir. 1975). The effective-
ness of statistical evidence must be assessed at these different stages. Id. The need for
compartmentalization is exemplified in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). In
Whitus, the proof was based on a disparity between black composition in the source,
segregated tax lists, 27.1%, and composition of grand and petit jury venires, 9.1% and
7.8%. The tax lists were used to uphold the challenge to the selection process, but a
challenge might also have been registered against the composition of the source itself.
There was a 15.5% disparity between eligible black population and composition on the
tax lists, as against the 33.5% disparity between eligibles and composition of jury
venires. While in Whitus discrimination occurred at two stages in the jury selection
process, compartmentalization of data may serve to isolate the occurrence of discrimi-
nation in the process. Instead of strictly compartmentalizing data for each stage of the
process, the Fourth Circuit in Spratley found rather uncautiously that evidence of
population versus eligible population was the same as evidence in Stephens of venires
versus population. See note 81 supra.
Categories of evidence often vary according to the state jury selection process. The
categories utilized by courts are as follows: (1) population versus eligible popula-
tion-Spratley v. Paderick, 528 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1975); (2) population versus ven-
ire-Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Muniz v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1970); (3) eligible population versus qualified jury panel-Carmical v. Craven, 457
F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971) (those who passed test); Black v. Curb, 464 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.
1972) (eligibility list submitted by jury commissioner); (4) composition of source (tax
records) versus actual service-Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
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later questioning him in the absence of counsel. The right to the
presence of counsel during police questioning is another substantive
right for which habeas corpus relief is appropriate.'4 In Strickland v.
Garrison,'5 the Fourth Circuit found that petitioner's state court con-
viction for robbery was invalid because his confession had been ob-
tained in violation of the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.,"
Strickland was informed of his Miranda rights at 9:00 a.m. in the
local police station. At that time, he requested a lawyer and police
halted the interrogation. Strickland subsequently was transferred to
the county law enforcement center where he was again warned of his
rights at about 3:00 p.m. and asked if he wanted to make a statement.
In the absence of counsel, Strickland stated that he understood his
rights, and he confessed. 10
Relying upon Miranda, the Strickland court noted that it was
improper for the police to initiate any communication with the sus-
pect other than through his legal representative, even for the limited
purpose of persuading him to reconsider his insistence upon the pres-
ence of counsel. 00 The Fourth Circuit strictly interpreted the com-
mand of Miranda that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."'0 0
The court of appeals reasoned that the Miranda decision created a
per se rule against further interrogation once the request for counsel
is made.
The Fourth Circuit in Strickland has recognized only one limited
situation in which a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel in
a custodial interrogation may change his mind and decide to submit
to questioning without the aid of counsel."0 According to the court, a
"o See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
' Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976), disposition
recorded 538 F.2d 325.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 3 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 325.
'" The court noted that the suspect's subjective intent in requesting a lawyer is
irrelevant to the state's obligation to provide one. Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-
1683, slip op. at 3 (4th Cir. Jund 28, 1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 325.
11 384 U.S. at 474.
"I Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 325, relying upon United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1972). In Tafoya, the defendant was arrested, taken into custody and twice
advised of his rights. The arresting officer then asked the defendant if he wanted to
discuss the charges. The defendant declined and stated that he wanted to speak to a
lawyer. Subsequently, while in a jail cell, the defendant expressed a desire to speak
with a specific officer. Approximately an hour later, that officer received the defendant
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suspect must initiate the second interrogation himself" in order to
waive his right to the presence of counsel. In all other cases, the court
has held that Miranda dictates the exclusion of a confession obtained
from a suspect who has yielded to police pressure that he proceed
without counsel."2 The police cannot initiate the re-interrogation be-
fore a suspect actually consults an attorney."
3
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme
Court's rule in Michigan v. Mosley,"' that a suspect's invocation of
his right to remain silent does not forever foreclose further efforts at
interrogation,"' had no application to this case."' The Strickland
from the jailer, advised him of his rights for a third time, and heard the accused's
confession, which was later admitted into evidence. 459 F.2d at 425-26. The Tafoya
court held that the defendant had effectively waived his right to have counsel present
during the interrogation when he had initiated the interview. Id. at 427-28. In
Strickland, the police improperly initiated communication with the suspect after he
had expressed his wish to be represented by counsel but had not yet met with him.
Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 325.
"I Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976),
disposition recorded 538 F.2d 325. Accord, United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424, 427
(10th Cir. 1972).
"I United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. United States
v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1966).
113 United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974).
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
Id. at 102-03. Respondent, who had been arrested in connection with certain
robberies, was advised by a detective in accordance with Miranda that he was not
obliged to answer any questions and that he could remain silent if he wished. Having
made oral and written acknowledgment of the Miranda warnings, he declined to dis-
cuss the robberies, whereupon the detective ceased the interrogation. More than two
hours later, after re-administering Miranda warnings, another detective questioned
respondent solely about an unrelated murder. Respondent made an inculpatory state-
ment, which was later used in his trial for murder, resulting in his conviction. The
Court held that the admission in evidence of respondent's incriminating statement did
not violate Miranda principles. Respondent's right to "cut off" questioning was "scru-
pulously honored," the police immediately having ceased the robbery interrogation
after his refusal to answer and having commenced questioning about the murder only
after a significant lapse of time and after a fresh set of warnings had been given. See
generally Boss, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Erosion of Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 861 (1976). See also Comment, Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional
Procedure, 54 N.C.L. REv. 695 (1976).
The Mosley Court found that the great majority of federal and state courts have
held that Miranda does not absolutely prohibit further questioning once the accused
has elected to remain silent. 423 U.S. at 103 n.9 (1975). But see United States v. Clark,
499 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974).
"' The Fourth Circuit held that an examination of Mosley indicated that it was
inapplicable to Strickland. Strickland v. Garrison, Civ. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 3-4 (4th
Cir. June 28, 1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 324. The accused in Mosley did not
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court noted that the opportunity to remain silent and the right to an
attorney are procedural safeguards which the Miranda Court distin-
guished. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that Mosley permits
an implied waiver of rights despite an earlier demand to have an
attorney."7 The Ninth Circuit relied on the broad implication of
Mosley that Miranda is not to be interpreted literally."' Mosley is
indicate a desire to consult with a lawyer at any time during the interrogation. 423 U.S.
at 97. The Supreme Court indicated that Mosley does not involve the procedures to
be followed when the accused requests the assistance of counsel. Rather, the Mosley
Court noted that such procedures were clearly detailed in Miranda. 423 U.S. at 101
n.7. By its reference to the plain language of Miranda, the Supreme Court in Mosley
apparently proscribed the resumption of questoning after an accused has requested the
presence of an attorney until an attorney is present. See also 423 U.S. at 104 n.10; 423
U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring); 423 U.S. at 116 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 367 (9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit
held that a kidnapping suspect who insisted upon seeing a lawyer but decided to
cooperate after learning of the extensive evidence against him voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights. The Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit essentially differ in analyti-
cal approach. The Fourth Circuit favors a literal reading of the Miranda guidelines
because the Supreme Court said the purpose of Miranda was "to give concrete consti-
tutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384 U.S. at 441-
42. In contrast, the Pheaster-Mosley approach employs several factors which are remi-
niscent of the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances" test. Boss, Michigan v.
Mosley: A Further Erosion of Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 857, 870 (1976). This
inconsistency among circuits reflects the difference between Miranda and Mosley
which has underscored the philosophical shift from the Warren Court to the Burger
Court. Id.
In Brewer v. Williams, the Supreme Court was asked to overrule or limit Miranda
by replacing it with a voluntariness standard based upon the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding an inculpatory statement. In a 5 - 4 decision the Court reaffirmed
Miranda and held that Iowa had deprived the accused of his constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel by failing to sustain its burden of proving that the accused
had waived his right to counsel in accordance with the Johnson waiver standard.
Brewer v. Williams, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1977) (No. 74-1263).
In Brewer, a child-stealing warrant had been issued for the accused's arrest. The
defendant contacted a Des Moines attorney who advised him to surrender to Daven-
port police and later not to make any statements during his 163-mile transportation
from Davenport to Des Moines. A transporting policeman agreed with defendant's
attorney not to question respondent. In addition, he knew that the accused was an
escapee from a Missouri mental institution. Police informed the accused of his
Miranda rights before leaving on the trip, but did not repeat them enroute to Des
Moines. During the trip the defendant made inculpatory statements which led to the
discovery of the victim's body. The issue was whether the defendant had effectively
waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the 163-mile trip.
"" The Pheaster court noted that the Supreme Court in Mosley refused to examine
in depth the effect of a suspect's request for an attorney. 544 F.2d at 367. While the
specific holding in Mosley was not direct precedent for Pheaster, the Ninth Circuit
found that "Mosley does indicate both a recognition that the procedure set out in
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indicative of the recent trend toward erosion of the literal require-
ments of Miranda."'
In recent habeas corpus decisions, the Fourth Circuit has taken
few novel positions and has decided habeas cases consistently with
its prior holdings. The court has dealt with the procedural require-
ments of waiver and exhaustion, which promote the orderly adminis-
tration of habeas corpus relief.'12 Recent Supreme Court decisions
have blurred the concept of waiver as articulated in Fay v. Noia and
relied upon by the Fourth Circuit."' The waiver test has been modi-
fied by the Supreme Court's analysis of state compulsion'2 and the
increased possibility of finding waiver by a procedural default.'1 The
Fourth Circuit will now have to analyze Fay in light of these deci-
sions.
The Fourth Circuit has also examined cases which analyze appro-
priate substantive grounds for habeas corpus relief. Under previously
settled law, the exclusionary rule was applied to habeas corpus cases
where there had been an illegal search and seizure. 24 In Campbell v.
Superintendent, the court reviewed a petitioner's claim that evidence
should have been excluded because an illegal arrest rendered the
subsequent search and seizure violative of the fourth amendment.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, however, the
only question for review of a habeas corpus petition based upon a
search and seizure claim is whether the petitioner was provided a fair
opportunity to raise the claim and have it fully adjudicated in state
courts. The Fourth Circuit's review of such cases is substantially
restricted by Stone. In the area of discriminatory jury composition,
the Fourth Circuit should administer the statistical test differently.'1
Miranda is not as clear as the language of that opinion might suggest and a willingness
to import a greater degree of flexibility in the application of Miranda to varying factual
situations." Id. at 367. See generally Boss, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Erosion of
Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1976).
'" See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977). In a per curiam opinion,
a six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court recently held that a police officer who
invited a burglary suspect down to the police station was not required to give the
suspect Miranda warnings before questioning him about the crime because the interro-
gation was not custodial or coercive. See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 104-18 supra.
,, See text accompanying notes 11-58 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
22 See note 65 supra.
" See note 103 supra.
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One required element of a prima facie case, opportunity for discrimi-
nation, might be eliminated. 21 In addition, new tests based upon
statistics indicating discrimination might be employed. Finally, the
Fourth Circuit has continued to interpret strictly the requirement of
Miranda v. Arizona in the face of a trend toward its erosion.I2n The
court of appeals narrowly applied the Miranda per se rule against re-
interrogation of a witness who has invoked his right to counsel and
provided habeas relief for such a violation. While the Fourth Circuit
has followed long-standing precedents in its recent habeas corpus
decisions, many changes are forthcoming. The Supreme Court has
provided new procedural and substantive limitations with which the
Fourth Circuit may properly restrict the habeas corpus remedy and
which must be explored in upcoming cases.
JONATHAN SAGER
B. A New Consideration for Prison Administrators: The Practi-
cality of Increasing Prisoners' Privileges
Generally, federal courts will not interfere with internal prison
administraton.1 The rationales behind this "hands-off" doctrine are
the separation of powers,2 lack of judicial expertise in penology,3 and
the principles of federalism.' However, in cases where serious in-
126 See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 104-17 supra.
The courts formerly completely avoided intervention concerning the treatment
of inmates in prisons. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398 (1974); Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Ross v. Blackledge, 477 F.2d 616, 618 (4th Cir. 1973).
See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 985 (1962). Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
2 The courts express fear that judicial intervention in this area will subvert prison
discipline and undermine the authority of prison officials. The courts also recognize
that supervision of prisons is a function of the executive branch of government. See,
e.g., Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F.
Supp. 706, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1949); Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Of Straps and
Strip Cells, 19 CATH. LAW. 200, 202 (1973).
' See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 671 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noam.
Sellers v.Beto, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
This rationale recognizes that states, not the federal government, are responsible
for their prisons and prisoners. While acknowledging that administration of state pris-
ons is a state function, recent cases have held that where state regulation of prison
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fringements of fundamental rights have been alleged, federal courts
will assume jurisdiction and decide the rights of prisioners.5
The nonintervention policy has been modified because courts rec-
ognize that individuals do not lose all their constitutional rights when
they enter prison' and that prisoners complaining about the condi-
tions of their confinement should not be limited to the remedies
available in state courts.' To insure constitutional incarceration,
courts have applied the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendments to grant relief from the infliction of corporal pun-
inmates conflicts with federally guaranteed rights, the regulations must be invalida-
ted. E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969).
5 When prison conditions deteriorate to the extent that they violate laws or rights
under the Constitution, they become matters for the federal courts, which then have
a responsibility to fashion relief for these violations. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
822 (1974); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
The courts intervene in three major areas. First, courts require open access to the
courts, which includes communication with legal counsel and access to legal materials.
See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109-12 (N.D. Calif. 1970), aff'd 404 U.S. 15
(1971) (prison regulation limiting law books in prison libraries to a few volumes invalid
as denying prisoners reasonable access to courts notwithstanding state's arguments for
economy and standardization); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966) (per
curiam) (access to courts required); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del.'
1974) (access to law books a right not constitutionally required only if effective access
to courts assured by other means). Second, the courts require prison authorities to
respect prisoners' religious freedom and to avoid racial discrimination. See Washington
v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1966) aff'd 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (state
regulations requiring racial segregation in prisons unconstitutional); Sostre v. McGin-
nis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (prisoner in solitary confinement for discipline prob-
lems, not because of his religious beliefs). Finally, courts will intervene to protect a
prisoner from cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) aff'd 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (conditions and administration
of entire prison system constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Note, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: Of Straps and Strip Cells, 19 CATH. LAW. 200 (1973).
6 Rights that are not inconsistent with an inmate's status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate goals of the corrections process are not forfeited when a prisoner is
confined. These include: first amendment rights to freedom of expression, Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); and religion, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972);
fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection of the laws, Gray v. Creamer, 465
F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); and due process
of law, Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Stiltner v. Rhay,
322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963); cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964) and the eighth amend-
ment right of freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d
661 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th
Cir. 1971).
7 See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971); Note, Decency
and Fairness: An Emerging Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 847 (1971).
The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
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ishment' and harsh living conditions in the general prison popula-
tion, 0 and to ameliorate the conditions of segregated confinement."
In applying the eighth amendment to the prison setting, the
courts agree that solitary confinement 2 is a legitimate tool of prison
administration. 3 By confining those who violate prison rules or by
confining those who may be the object of other prisoners' violence,
prison authorities are better able to maintain discipline. Solitary
confinement is divided into two categories: administrative confine-
ment, imposed to protect a prisoner from harm; and punitive confine-
ment, imposed to punish a prisoner who has violated prison rules."
Usually, courts do not distinguish punitive isolation from administra-
tive segregation. 5 As a result, the treatment accorded inmates in both
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIn.
Originally, the eighth amendment prohibited only those punishments that were
viewed as cruel and unusual at the time of its adoption, such as drawing and quarter-
ing. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E.
582 (1921). This limited approach was changed in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910), where the Supreme Court held that punishment could violate the eighth
amendment not only because of its form, but also because of its grossly dispropor-
tionate relationship to the offense for which it was imposed.
' Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (whipping cruel and unusual
punishment per se).
,1 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) aff'd 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
"' The courts use the terms "solitary confinement," "segregated confinement,"
and "maximum security confinement" interchangeably. When they are distinguished,
"solitary" denotes the most severe punishment; "maximum security," the least severe.
Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786
(M.D. Tenn. 1969). See generally McAninch, Penal Incarcertation and Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 25 S.C.L. REv. 579 (1973).
"2 There are generally five reasons for imposing segregated confinement on an
inmate: (1) where the inmate is a threat to himself or others, Wright v. McMann, 387
F.2d 519, 526 n.15 (2d Cir. 1967); (2) where the prisoner is destructive of the physical
facilities of the prison, Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1969); (3)
where the prisoner is an escape threat, Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497, 500 (S.D. Ga.
1970), afl'd 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); (4) where the prisoner has
disobeyed prison rules, Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 1971); and
(5) where the prisoner causes an increased likelihood of rebellion, Fulwood v. Clemmer,
206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962).
'" See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2nd Cir. 1971); Burns v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
* See note 12 supra.
* The Fourth Circuit recognizes a difference between the two, but finds them
substantially alike in actual treatment. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 777
(4th Cir. 1968) (prison discipline problems confined in same facility as those in admin-
istrative confinement); Howard v.Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 429 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
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circumstances is, in many situations, essentially the same.,, How-
ever, subjecting prisoners who are protectively segregated to the same
deprivations as those to which prisoners punitively segregated are
subjected raises questions of fairness and due process of law." By
according great weight to prison officials' determinations that admin-
istrative segregation is required by the particular inmate's potential
for disrupting the institution, 8 most courts have avoided considering
these issues. This modified "hands-off" approach, therefore, gener-
ally acts to preclude prisoner recovery unless exceptional abuses are
shown."
The validity of any particular form of solitary confinement de-
U.S. 988 (1966) (privileges limited whether punishment described as "punishment" or
.segregation").
11 Administrative segregation is distinguished from punitive segregation in that
the latter is imposed as punishment, and the former is imposed for the protection of
the inmate from himself or others, or for protection of other inmates from him. The
length of the confinement is also a significant distinction. Administrative confinement
is for an indefinite period while the length of punitive confinement is at the reasonable
discretion of prison administrators. Under the eighth amendment, there is no signifi-
cance in the distinction between the two when a condition is deemed to be per se
violative of the cruel and unusual clause such as stocks or the rack. See Singer,
Confining Solitary Confinement: Constitutional Arguments For A "New Penology, " 56
IOWA L. REV. 1251 (1971); Comment, Prisoner's Constitutional Rights: Segregated
Confinement as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 1972 WASH. U.L.W. 347.
11 See Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 582 (4th Cir. 1972) (Craven, J., dissent-
ing). But see O'Brian v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1974).
1 See United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973)
(petitioner's classification as security risk justified solitary confinement); Blake v.
Pryse, 444 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (maintenance of inmate health and
hygiene justified confinement conditions); Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (10th Cir.
1964) (per curiam); cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965) (enforcement of prison rules not
improper reason for solitary confinement).
In the absence of factual allegations sufficient to establish that a prisoner has been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, the summary administration of discipline,
including the use of physical force, does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Cullum v. California Dep't of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D.
Cal. 1967) (prisoner refused to move at direction of guard). This reasoning was recently
affirmed in two Fourth Circuit cases involving alleged assaults by prison guards. Pat-
terson v. Leeke, 529 F.2d 516, No. 74-2091 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 1976) (prisoner refused to
allow guard to examine his locker and cursed at guard; guard's response by shaking
prisoner held not to be sufficiently brutal as to shock the conscience and support a §
1983 claim); Brown v. Mandel, No. 75-1735 (4th Cir. May 13, 1976) (prison guard
pushing prisoner against wall in response to derogatory remarks not excessive force
since no injury inflicted and force applied in good faith effort to maintain discipline).
" The courts conduct a balancing test, and if no clear abuse of prisoners' rights
is shown, the court will generally uphold the judgment of the prison administrator. See,
e.g., Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367, 368 (10th Cir. 1967).
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pends on the harshness of its conditions. 0 There are certain basic
standards of sanitation and nutrition that segregated confinement
must meet."' However, like any other punishment challenged under
the eighth amendment, the conditions of any particular solitary con-
finement must be reviewed on a case by case basis. The test usually
applied to determine if conditions under which an inmate is confined
is constitutional is whether they are so offensive as to "shock the
general conscience." These determinations require the courts to de-
cide what conditions shock society's conscience. Although the test
applied is objective,2 4 the determinations are necessarily subjective,"
and there is little uniformity among the courts.
2
1
529 F.2d at 860-61.
2 These basic standards include: adequate lighting, LaReau v. MacDougall, 473
F.2d 974, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973); opportunities to
wash, White v. Commissioner of Ala. Bd. of Corrections, 470 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1972)
(per curiam); adequate heating and ventilation, Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521
(2d Cir. 1967); adequate clothing and bedding, Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 187,
192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma. Nosser v. Bradley, 409 U.S. 848 (1972);
opportunity to exercise, Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (E.D. La. 1971)
(5th Cir. 1970); toilet facilities, Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 789 (M.D. Tenn.
1969); medical care, Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966) (per cur-
iam); adequate nutrition, Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036, 1062 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
aff'd 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906 (1971). But cf. Crowe v.
Leeke, 540 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1976) (overcrowded conditions in maximum security,
forcing one inmate to sleep on floor, not cruel and unusual punishment; however,
prisoner scheduled to be transferred to new facility under construction). The Supreme
Court has held that prison administrators must give general recognition to prisoner's
rights. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam).
2 These conditions must be measured against what the Supreme Court has
termed "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
" This subjective test inquires whether a condition "shocks [the] general consci-
ence or [is] intolerable in fundamental fairness." Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972
(8th Cir. 1965). This test is also characterized as whether contemporary society would
reject a certain punishment. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957). When determining
if punishment is unconstitutional, the courts decide if it is disproportionate to the
offense for which it is imposed. Punishment that is disproportionate to the offense for
which it is imposed is deemed to shock society's conscience. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d
786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1971). However, this disproportionate
test is inapplicable where the condition complained of is not a condition of a punish-
ment.
24 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1970).
2 See Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Prison Conditions: Shocking Stan-
dards and Good Faith, 44 FoRDHA L. REV. 950, 959 (1976); Note, Constitutional
Law-The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1973).
2' Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 667-69 (5th Cir. 1971) (no "shocking" conditions
where solitary cells were clean and prisoners provided with basic elements of hygiene);
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In Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections,2 a state
prisoner who had been segregated for over five years sued South Caro-
lina prison officials,2 seeking both injunctive and monetary relief
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.29 Sweet had been placed
in administrative segregation at his own request after threats to his
life were made by other inmates. 0 While Sweet did not request return
to the general prison population, he argued that to subject him to the
same deprivations as those of prisoners punitively segregated was
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth
amendment."
Applying the "shock the conscience" test, the district court found
no evidence io support any of the plaintiff's allegations that condi-
tions of confinement violated any constitutional rights, and dis-
missed the action." The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (quality of solitary confinement
not shocking when adequate diet, personal hygiene implements, general reading mat-
ter, opportunities for exercise, and for participation in group therapy available to
prisoner); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 509 (10th Cir. 1969) (prison officials allowing
beating and mistreatment at hands of other prisoners cruel and unusual);.Landman
v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (E.D. -Va. 1973) (shocking practices included
unnecessary use of tear gas and practice of handcuffing inmates to cell bars).
- 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975).
21 The defendants, sued both officially and individually, were the director of the
South Carolina Department of Corrections and the Warden of the Central Correctional
Institution. Id. at 857. Monetary relief Was denied because the prison warden estab-
lished good faith reliance on prison procedures as a defense to a prisoner's suit for
compensatory damages brought under § 1983. Id. at 866. See Skinner v. Spellman, 480
F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (warden entitled to immunity when relying on validity of
procedure held invalid in that case).
n 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Although prisoners do not have to exhaust state reme-
dies when bringing a civil rights action under § 1983, Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249, 251 (1971) (per curiam), when a prisoner brings a writ of habeas corpus to compel
his release he must exhaust all state remedies before bringing the suit. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) (1970). See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (writ of habeas corpus).
30 Sweet was privy to the details of a planned prison riot and was either threatened
by some of the co-conspirators and reported their actions to the prison guards, or else
disclosed the riot plans to the guards and thus incurred the other inmates' wrath. 529
F.2d at 857.
31 The more important deprivations which Sweet alleged were: (1) that he had
been denied reading and writing material; (2) that he had been denied extra food; (3)
that he had been denied adequate medical care; (4) that he had been denied the right
to engage in regular religious services; and (5) that he was allowed only two one-hour
exercise periods, each followed lby a shower per week. 529 F.2d at 854.
22 Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, No. 70-160 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 1970).
The Fourth Circuit found no evidence to support plaintiff's allegations of denials of
reading and writing material, adequate medical care or any denial of extra food to
plaintiff. The court further found that the prison authorities were reasonably justified
652 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
lower court's decision that these alleged deprivations, even if true,
did not violate the eighth amendment, except for one allegation that
Sweet was denied sufficient opportunity to exercise and shower.
The majority applied a two prong analysis to determine whether
Sweet's confinement satisfied constitutional standards. First, the
court considered if the conditions of his confinement met minimum
constitutional standards.33 This involved not only consideration of the
basic physical conditions of confinement, but also how these condi-
tions affected the prisoner when viewed with the other circumstances
of his confinement. Second, the court considered whether the confine-
ment constituted a rationale means to reach a permissible end., The
court recognized that to separate Sweet for his own protection was a
rationale means to reach a legitimate prison objective, and thus satis-
fied the latter test.3
The Fourth Circuit, however, remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether Sweet's opportunities to exercise
and shower met minimum constitutional standards. The lower court
was instructed to determine if, considering the indefinite length of
Sweet's confinement, 3 the restricted opportunities to exercise and
shower would be harmful to his health. If these restrictions were
harmful, they would constitute cruel and unusual punishment man-
dating relief.3 7 The Fourth Circuit specifically noted that reasonable
restrictions of exercise and shower opportunities during punitive seg-
regation ordinarily would not transgress constitutional standards
because such confinement, usually imposed only for short periods of
time, would not have the same adverse impact on the prisoner's
health that the indefinite nature of administrative segregation might
have."
In addition, the Foruth Circuit indicated that since the limitation
on exercise time might be harmful to Sweet's health, the district
in not allowing plaintiff to attend regular chapel services with the general prison
population in the interest of prison discipline and order. 529 F.2d at 862-65.
529 F.2d at 860.
Id. at 857-58.
Id. at 861.
39 Id. at 866. Length of segregated confinement for administrative purposes is
"indefinite" in the federal system. See, e.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 666 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1971).
11 529 F.2d at 866. See generally Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390, 1392
(D.S.C. 1976) (constitutional issue could be found as to deprivation of exercise in
solitary confinement); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (E.D. La. 1971)
(exercise yards must be provided for condemned prisoners where it could be done
economically and without impairment of security).
11 529 F.2d at 866. See note 36 supra.
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court should consider the practicality of expanding Sweet's exercise
privileges without unduly burdening prison administration.2 Appar-
ently, the court thought that a restriction on exercise time for an
indefinite period raised a presumption that the restriction would ad-
versely affect health. Consequently, even without actual proof of
harm to the prisoner, prison authorities should increase exercise op-
portunities if practical. 0
In Sweet, the Fourth Circuit moved away from the position it took
in Breeden v. Jackson,4' a case involving facts almost identical to
those in Sweet. The majority in Breeden held that where the condi-
tions of administrative segregation were the usual incidents of con-
finement in maximum security," the deprivations were constitution-
ally permissable.4 3 Unlike the Sweet court, the Breeden court failed
to distinguish punitive from administrative segregation and thus did
not consider the constitutionality of administrative solitary confine-
ment and the extended periods of time for which it may be imposed.
The Sweet court, however, remanding for consideration of the effects
of the indefiniteness of Sweet's solitary confinement and the practi-
cality of expanding his exercise and shower privileges, was careful to
note that this analysis would be inapplicable to prisoners punitively
segregated because such confinement was for a limited period."
Judge Butzner filed a concurring opinion stating that although
the majority's remedy was better than no relief at all, it did not
1' 529 F.2d at 866. This 'practicality' criterion had not previously been applied by
the Fourth Circuit.
" Id. Although the case was remanded for consideration of the effect of both
shower and exercise limitations, the Fourth Circuit was primarily concerned with the
exercise issue. The opinion seems to suggest that the issue of showers was included in
the remand only because it was includable in the health issue presented by limited
exercise. The opinion is not clear as to whether showers are so closely linked to exercise
that one may not be considered without the other or whether showers may be a sepa-
rate consideration altogether. The court did not indicate whether the shower's issue
in and of itself would present a constitutional claim. See also Taylor v. Strickland, 411
F. Supp. 1390, 1395 (D.S.C. 1976).
457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972).
12 For a list of minimum standards which all segregated confinement must meet
to be consitutional, see note 21 supra.
457 F.2d at 581.
, 529 F.2d at 866. Punitive segregation is limited to a certain number of days. See,
e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, the potential health
hazards presented by extended periods of segregated confinement for adminstrative
purposes are not a problem in punitive segregation. However, experts disagree as to
the physical or psychological injury to the health of prisoners confined over extended
periods of time. Id. at 190 n.11.
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provide the full relief required by the eighth amendment.45 He con-
cluded that confining Sweet under the same conditions as those of
prisoners punitively segregated, when he had broken no prison rules,
thus denied him due process and equal protection of the law.4"
Judge Butzner's conclusion that solitary confinement for protec-
tive reasons constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment arose from his application of a different
constitutional test from that applied by the majority to Sweet's con-
finement. 7 Butzner reasoned that since Sweet was deprived of the
same privileges as punitively segregated prisoners, his confinement
constituted punishment. 8 Sweet's segregation should be analyzed not
in terms of whether it satisfied minimum standards of sanitation,
health, and nutrition, but rather in terms of whether it was dispropor-
tionate to the conduct for which it was imposed. Because Sweet had
violated no prison regulations, under this analysis his confinement
was clearly excessive punishment disproportionate to his conduct. 9
The validity of applying the disproportionate test to Sweet's con-
finement depends on the propriety of Judge Butzner's conclusion that
the conditions of confinement are punishment. The South Carolina
prison officials clearly did not intend to punish Sweet,"0 nor did Sweet
himself consider his confinement to be punishment. 1 Segregated con-
finement was no more than a reasonable means by which the prison
authorities could protect Sweet. To view this confinement as punish-
ment instead of as an acceptable tool of prison discipline for control
and protection ignores the practical limitations of prison administra-
tion . 2 Solitary confinement of Sweet was not punishment but rather
529 F.2d at 866-67 (Butzner, J., concurring). Judge Butzner was joined by Judge
Winter and Judge Craven.
' Id. at 868.
' Judge Butzner argued that the test of proportionality of punishment to the
offense for which it was imposed was applicable to Sweet's confinement in solitary for
protective reasons. Since Sweet had committed no violation of prison rules, Judge
Butzner concluded that solitary confinement was an excessive "punishment." Id. at
868. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). A
punishment may be cruel and unusual when it goes beyond what is necessary to
achieve a legitimate penal aim. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal.
1966).
529 F.2d at 868.
I d.
Id. at 857. For other cases recognizing solitary confinement as a legitimate
method for protection of prisoners, see note 52 infra.
5' 529 F.2d at 858.
52 See, e.g., O'Brian v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974); Adams v. Pate,
445 F.2d 105, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir.
1971).
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a reasonable means to meet the legitimate end of prison protection,
thus rendering application of the disproportionate test inappropriate.
Judge Butzner further argued that even under the majority's test
Sweet's confinement was wrongful. He reasoned that prison disci-
pline was not promoted by placing the victims of prison lawlessness
in solitary confinement while those who threatened them enjoyed the
privileges of prisoners at large. 53 Thus, administrative segregation
was not a rational means to meet a legitimate end and the second
prong of the majority's test was not satisfied. Judge Butzner thought
that prison authorities should be obligated to provide protection for
inmates without any sacrifice of their general prison privileges.54 In
support of this argument, Judge Butzner observed that alternative
means of protection existed that did not necessitate Sweet's sacrific-
ing any privileges, such as: isolation or transfer of prisoners who
threatened Sweet's life; 5 provision of extra guards for Sweet so he
could safely enjoy more privileges;56 or transfer of Sweet to another
institution.5
These alternatives ignore the realities of prison administration.
First, Sweet was threatened by an extremely large number of his
fellow inmates" and the prison plainly did not have the physical
529 F.2d at 867.
', Id. at 869.
Id. Initiative and decision to transfer are entirely within the discretion of prison
officials. Cf. Kohler v. Nicholson, 117 F.2d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 1941) (discretion to
transfer federal prisoner within sole discretion of U.S. Atty. Gen.). The courts may be
reluctant to direct the state Attorney General to commit a state prisoner to a. federal
institution because a federal statute which confers this control of federal prisons on
the United States Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1970). See Thogmartin v.
Moseley, 313 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. Kan. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970). See also Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1976)
(New York law that prison commissioner has absolute right to transfer or not transfer
state prisoners upheld); Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390, 1394 (D.S.C. 1976)
(although plaintiff alleges he could not safely rejoin general inmate population, there
was no constitutional violation in the denial of transfer); Note, A Prisoner's Right to a
Protective Transfer from State to Federal Prison, 50 IND. L.J. 143 (1974).
" 529 F.2d at 869.
5' Id. Cf. Kersh v. Bounds, 501 F.2d 585, 588-89 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975) (where change in prison administrative practices would be a nuisance
and administrative inconvenience, no change required as long as practices were reason-
able and rationale means to legitimate prison ends). See note 53 supra.
Im 529 F.2d at 863. To incarcerate a large number of individuals is more burden-
some in terms of space limitations as well as administrative burdens. Although this is
true in the Sweet case, this alternative may be more practical where there are fewer
prison victimizers. Still, this approach would result in a significant reduction in the
flexibility that prison officials need to frame individual treatment for prisoners. This
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facilities to segregate these wrongdoers in order to protect Sweet.59
Second, although extra guards could be provided for Sweet at an
increased cost, to hire new guards whenever a prisoner requires spe-
cial protection would be a significant administrative burden, aside
from the considerations of expense. Finally, although transfer might
allow more privileges, Sweet did not request a transfer. No state or
federal statute confers the right to be transferred, nor is that any
judicial decision that recognizes such a right.6" Thus, while these
alternative means may be effective protective measures, they are
unnecessary and unreasonable since they place significant burdens
on prison authorities as a means to alleviate minimal deprivations of
a prisoner's movement-while confined. Moreover, for a court to order
any one of these alternatives would constitute a substantial intrusion
into prison administration, an area in which the courts have consis-
tently held prison administrators are to retain primary responsibil-
ity.61
Although the majority's holding reaffirms the hands-off doctrine,
it apparently justifies judicial intervention into the area of adminis-
trative confinement, even without "shocking conditions," upon a
prima facie shocing that a condition of confinement might have an
adverse impact on the health of a prisoner. The opinion, however,
does not provide any guidance as to what health considerations raise
constitutional issues or what will constitute a prima facie showing
that a condition is harmful to a prisoner. Indeed, a recent district
court, faced with limitations on an administratively confined pris-
oner's shower privileges, noted that under the Sweet opinion almost
any physical limitation could affect a prisoner's health.1
2
Although on remand the district court in Sweet should establish
some guidelines for the courts, the Fourth Circuit opinion currently
requires a case by case analysis of each condition of administrative
confinement to determine if it raises health hazards sufficient to
justify court intervention. This approach is conceivably as intrusive
into the affairs of prison management as the overseer position which
the Fourth Circuit was attempting to avoid .6 3 If prison administrators
would also closely involve the courts with the administration of prisons, an unwanted
burden for the courts. See text accompanying notes 1-4, infra.
"' See 529 F.2d at 863.
- See note 53 supra.
" See notes 18-19 supra.
Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 n.13 (D.S.C. 1976) (considering
whether a prisoner in administrative confinement should have increased shower privi-
leges, the court speculated as to whether district judges would next have to decide how
many times a prisoner should "brush his teeth, go to the bathroom, wipe his nose,
comb his hair, or scratch.")
529 F.2d at 859.
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must have every restriction of solitary confinement reviewed as to its
constitutional impact, the Fourth Circuit will, in effect, have dis-
carded the hands-off doctrine. A more desirable approach would have
been to limit the analysis concerning the indefinite nature of admin-
istrative segregation to specific and substantial health hazards which
prison authorities can reasonably avoid. This would have provided
tangible guidelines for the district courts and limited judicial inter-
vention into prison administration to a more reasonable level.
JEAN L. BYASSEE
C. Due Process and Prisoner Transfer and Reclassification
Prisoner transfer and classification affects nearly every aspect of
daily life in a prison.' Because of the impact of transfer and classifica-
tion decisions on a prison inmate's existence, due process questions
have been raised regarding the procedure used in making such deci-
sions.' Until recently, courts have declined to consider procedural due
process questions in the context of discretionary administrative deci-
sions within prisons.3 Prisoners thus had been without judicial reme-
dies for potentially arbitrary decisions by prison officials.,
The Supreme Court, however, developed certain due process re-
I A prisoner's classification determines his place of confinement, his access to
medical care and particular treatment programs, his work assignments, his eligibility
for good time, and the likelihood of his receiving parole. In addition, all privileges
available to a prisoner depend upon his classification status. Such privileges include
outdoor recreation, access to the prison commissary, frequent visitation, access to a
library, opportunity to work outside the prison, and amount of compensation received
for prison labor. A transfer or reclassification of a prisoner may result in any or all of
these matters being re-determined. H. KERPR & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
CONVICTED 336 (1974).
1 Id. at 450-53. See also Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 664 (M.D. Ala.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 523 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1975); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415,
431-32 (D. Md. 1966).
The recent trend is exemplified by Parker v. McKelthen, 488 F.2d 553, 556 (5th
Cir. 1974), where, in the context of an eighth amendment violation claim, the court
stated: "[It can no longer be correctly asserted that the federal courts are unwilling
in all situations to review the actions of state prison administrators to determine the
existence of possible violations of constitutional rights." See also note 2 supra.
See Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statisti-
cal Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 527, 540 (1975); see also
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
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quirements for prison administrative proceedings in Wolff v.
McDonnell.5 Wolff required that a prisoner receive written notice of
charges against him at least 24 hours prior to an administrative hear-
ing, that the factfinders provide a written statement of the evidence
relied upon and the reason for the action, and that the inmate be
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence "when
permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals."6 However, the Supreme Court held that
neither the right to confront and cross-examine accusers, nor the right
to counsel were required under this limited due process test.7
The scope of the Wolff holding was narrowly confined in the recent
decision of Meachum v. Fano.8 The Supreme Court in Meachum held
that due process does not require a Wolff-type hearing9 in prisoner
transfer cases, even if the convict is transferred to a prison where the
conditions are substantially less favorable."0 The Court reasoned that
- 418 U.S. 539 (1974). McDonnell, an inmate in a Nebraska prison, brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for damages, alleging the denial of due process in a
prison disciplinary proceeding. Under Nebraska's disciplinary scheme, good time cred-
its are forfeited in cases of serious misconduct, and privileges are forfeited for less
serious misbehavior. The procedure for establishing misconduct prior to Wolff was to
hold a conference at which the prisoner was informed orally of the charges against him
and to prepare a conduct report for a hearing before the disciplinary committee where
the accused was allowed to ask questions of the charging party. The Court found these
proceedings inadequate under due process standards. 418 U.S. at 546-58.
Id. at 566. See generally 20th Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law
1974-75-Prisoners' Rights, 61 VA. L. REv. 1822 (1975).
1 418 U.S. at 567-70. The Supreme Court reasoned that "[prison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due
a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. . . .[T]here must be mutual accom-
modation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Consti-
tution that are of general application." Id. at 556.
- 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976). Meachum involved § 1983 claims by prisoners in a Massa-
chusetts medium security prison. Plaintiffs alleged that they were being transferred
to less favorable institutions without adequate factual hearings, and hence were de-
prived of due process of law. Three of the claimants had been moved to a maximum
security prison. Id. at 2535-37.
See text accompanying note 5 supra.
96 S. Ct. at 2538-39. The Supreme Court indicated in Meachum that a change
in conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner
involved does not per se deserve due process protection. The due process clause forbids
convicting a person of a crime and depriving him of his liberty without compliance with
the requirements of the clause. However, a valid conviction has the effect of constitu-
tionally depriving a defendant of his liberty. Thereafter the convict cannot expect the
due process clause to guarantee him assignment to a particular prison, even though
the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different from that in another.
"The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to em-
power the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Id. at 2538.
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if a prisoner has been duly convicted and incarcerated, he has been
constitutionally deprived of his liberty and thus cannot expect the
due process clause to shield him from intra-prison system transfers."
The Wolff due process requirements were held to be applicable only
when a state-created liberty interest, such as good time credit, is at
stake."2 The Meachum Court determined that prisoners have no in-
herent constitutional liberty interest in location of incarceration to
which the due process clause affords protection. 13
Against this background of Supreme Court decisions concerning
prisoners' due process rights in transfer and reclassification, the
Fourth Circuit recently decided three cases in which these issues were
raised: Kirby v. Blackledge,4 Benfield v. Bounds, 5 and Bratten v.
Davis." Kirby and Benfield were handed down prior to Meachum
and thus did not benefit from that decision's interpretation of Wolff.
Bratten, however, was a post-Meachum case and directly applied
that decision.
In Kirby v. Blackledge,"' North Carolina State Prison officials
reclassified and assigned several inmates to a maximum security cell
block after informal hearings. The prisoners sued prison officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The district court summarily granted
" Id.
12 Id. at 2539. The language in Wolff provided the Meachum Court with ample
support for the proposition that the liberty interest at stake in Wolff was not present
in Meachum:
[The State having created the right to good time and itself recogniz-
ing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct,
the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him to those mini-
mum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required
by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
' 96 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
" 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976).
540 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1976).
" No. 75-1664 (4th Cir., Aug. 6, 1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 323.
17 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976).
"1 Id. at 584-85. In addition to raising a due process claim, the plaintiffs asserted
that they were subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the prison. Id. at
585-86. Plaintiffs alleged that a firehose occasionally was used on the prisoners; that
they were allowed only two hours of recreation per week, and only one shave every three
days, with 31 prisoners using the same blade; that prisoners were denied access to a
doctor and to a library; and that the cells were covered with filth. Finally, they alleged
the existence of a punishment room known as the "Chinese Cell," of which the court
remarked:
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defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.'9 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the summary judgment and held that the reclassification
hearings did not comply with the Wolff due process requirements. 0
The court determined that the Kirby plaintiffs did not receive ad-
vance written notice of the charges against them or any statement of
the evidence or reasoning of the committee which reclassified them.
Thus, the prison officials did not satisfy those due process standards
established in Wolff."
The Meachum decision, which limited the application of the
Wolff standards, was decided subsequent to Kirby. Wolff's restricted
applicability, however, would not have affected the Fourth Circuit's
decision on the Kirby facts. Meachum pointed out that a real liberty
interest such as good time credit must be at stake before the Wolff
minimum standards attach.2 Such a liberty interest was at stake in
Kirby, since North Carolina provides a statutory right to good time
credit which is forfeited upon reclassification to maximum security.3
Thus, the Meachum decision did not disturb the Kirby holding that
Wolff due process standards were applicable.
In Bratten v. Davis, 4 the Fourth Circuit relied on Meachum as the
basis for its holding.2 The plaintiff, an inmate in a Virginia State
Prison, was transferred within the state prison system without Wolff-
type proceedings. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
transfers had adversely affected his chances of adjustment and reha-
bilitation, and that he had been denied due process since each trans-
fer had not been accompanied by a Wolff hearing.26 The Fourth Cir-
The prisoners' allegation no. 1 is so bizarre that it is difficult to believe
that such a situation could exist in our society; it is reminiscent of the
Black Hole of Calcutta. The allegation i.s that there is a strip or
"Chinese Cell" where prisoners are occasionally placed in which there
is no bedding, no light, and no toilet facilities save a hole in the floor.
Id. at 586.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the cruel and unusual
punishment claim without citing any authority holding such activity to be cruel and
unusual. Apparently, the court believed that the alleged activity was so outrageous
that a constitutional violation would be clear upon proof of the allegations. Id. at 587.
1 See id. at 585.
2o Id. at 587.
21 Id. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
22 96 S. Ct. at 2539.
22 GEN. STAT. N.C. § 162-46 (Repl. Vol. 1976); GEN. STAT. N.C. § 14-263 (Repl.
Vol. 1969).
24 No. 75-1664 (4th Cir. Aug 6, 1976), disposition recorded 538 F.2d 323.
2 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id. at 2. Bratten also alleged that $674.35 worth of personal property was taken
from him upon his arrival at Saint Brides Prison and was not returned to him when
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cuit held that the due process claim in Bratten was without merit
since no liberty interest such as good time credit was at issue.27
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wolff and Kirby, Bratten had not lost good
time credit as a result of the administrative action in question. 8 In
Virginia, a prisoner acquires good time for good behavior, and can
lose good time only through violation of prison disciplinary rules.
Virginia does not provide for any gain or loss of good time upon
transfer from one prison to another. 9 Consequently, the Fourth Cir-
cuit relied on Meachum to hold that the plaintiff had no liberty
interest at stake which required procedural due process safeguards in
administrative transfer proceedings.3
In another Fourth Circuit case, Benfield v. Bounds,' four separate
transfer and reclassification cases were combined on appeal.3 2 Each
of the plaintiffs alleged a denial of due process in the transfer or
reclassification proceeding involved. In two of the cases, Benfield v.
Bounds and Johnson v. Bounds, " the alleged violations occurred
prior to the Wolff decision.Y The Fourth Circuit held that since Wolff
he was transferred to Church Road Prison. The district court dismissed this portion of
the claim because the alleged deprivation did not rise to a level of constitutional
magnitude. Id. at 3. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Bratten was entitled to
recover this amount if the evidence supported his claim. There is no jurisdictional
minimum for a § 1983 suit. Id. at 4; accord, Lynch v. Household Finance, 405 U.S.
538, 546 (1972).
No. 75-1664 at 3.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-19.17, 107, 151, 210-214 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
Id. Virginia awards 10 days of good time for every twenty days an inmate spends
without a prison rule violation. Id. at § 53-213. The inmate may also acquire one to
five days of good time credit per month if he is engaged in a vocational or educational
training program. Id. at § 53-213.1. However, upon violation of a prison regulation, the
inmate must "forfeit such portion of accumulated credit for good conduct as may be
deemed proper by the Director." Id. at § 53-214.
" No. 75-1664 at 3.
540 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1976).
3 The four actions combined were: Benfield v. Bounds, No. 73-2159; Carroll v.
Jones, No. 75-1069; Johnson v. Bounds, No. 75-1867; Denson v. Department of Correc-
tions, No. 75-1868.
No. 75-1867, 540 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1976).
31 Benfield appeared before a classification board several times between 1971 and
1973. His record included seven felonies and four escapes. Prison officials claimed that
"reliable" sources had informed them that Benfield was arranging to smuggle two
pistols into the prison for purposes of escape. Subsequently, one pistol was found
within the prison walls. This incident led to the flurry of transfers and classification
board hearings. 540 F.2d at 673. Johnson's pro se complaint provided the only factual
information in that case, and because of its lack of clarity, the Fourth Circuit could
not ascertain exactly what had occurred. Id. at 674; -see note 37 infra.
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was not intended to apply retroactively, 3 the standards enunciated
in Wolff were not controlling with respect to these two plaintiffs.
The court affirmed the dismissal of Benfield's complaint, and ordered
Johnson remanded for lack of sufficient information.
37
The Fourth Circuit then considered the two remaining cases,
Carroll v. Jones3 and Denson v. Department of Corrections.39 Carroll
was a North Carolina prisoner who complained that his transfer from
one medium custody prison to another resulted in a major change in
the conditions of his confinement. Carroll requested damages as well
as declaratory and injunctive relief because he was denied a Wolff-
type hearing before his transfer occurred." The bare allegations of the
complaint did not indicate whether there was in fact a major change
in conditions of confinement. Thus, the court held that Wolff stan-
dards apply if a major change is found to have resulted from the
transfer and remanded the case for further findings on that issue.',
The validity of this determination, however, was altered by
Meachum and its companion case Montanye v. Haymes 2
Montanye dealt precisely with the Carroll problem: an intra-
prison system transfer unaccompanied by a Wolff-type hearing. The
Court held that a prisoner without a statutory right to remain at one
particular prison facility cannot demand Wolff due process measures
upon transfer, regardless of whether the transfer is for punitive or
administrative reasons.4 3 Thus, the remand of the Carroll case for
failure to satisfy Wolff due process standards was unnecessary, since
Carroll was not entitled to a Wolff hearing under the Montanye rul-
ing.
44
3 540 F.2d at 674, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573 (1974).
' 540 F.2d at 674.
" The district court had dismissed the Johnson complaint without requiring an
answer from defendants. The Fourth Circuit insisted on a response "containing suffi-
cient information to establish that the action complained of by the inmate was not so
egregiously unfair as to require relief." Id. Benfield was not remanded because there
was sufficient information at hand to indicate that he had not been reclassified as a
result of arbitrary or discriminatory conduct on the part of prison officials. Id. at 673-
74.
No. 75-1069, 540 F.2d 670 (4th cir. 1976).
"' No. 75-1868, 540 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1976).
SO 540 F.2d at 674-75.
Id. The district court had dismissed Carroll's complaint without requiring a
response from the defendants. The Fourth Circuit found Carroll's claim to have possi-
ble merit, and required the defendants to respond to the complaint upon remand. Id.
,2 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
" Id. at 2547.
" The Fourth Circuit relied on various courts of appeal cases for the proposition
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Plaintiff Denson in Denson v. Department of Corrections, was a
Virginia prisoner who complained that no hearing was afforded him
before his reclassification for violation of prison rules.15 Denson's pro
se complaint reveals, however, that he may have had an earlier hear-
ing at which his breach of the rules was determined, but which left
his classification unresolved."6 The Fourth Circuit found that a sepa-
rate Wolff hearing should have been granted before the prisoner's
classification was redetermined.7 Accordingly, the case was re-
manded to the district court."
As in Carroll, the result in Denson would have been altered if the
Fourth Circuit had had the benefit of Meachum and its "liberty
interest" orientation. In Virginia, the liberty interest of good time
credit does not vary according to classification, but rather, varies
according to time spent free of rule violations. 9 Thus, if the hearing
in which Denson was found guilty of rule violations satisfied the Wolff
standards, no due process rights were violated. Reclassification hear-
ings in Virginia, such as that desired by Denson, are not controlled
by Wolff since good time determinations in Virginia are wholly inde-
pendent of classification procedures. No liberty interests are at stake
in Virginia reclassification hearings, 0 and thus, the remand of
that Wolff standards apply not only to punitive transfers but to administrative trans-
fers as well if the result will subject the inmate to "potentially materially adverse
effects." 540 F.2d at 675. See Lokey v. Richardson, 527 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975); Carlo
v. Gunter, 520 F.2d 1293 (1st Cir. 1975); Gomes v. Travigono, 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir.
1974) (per curiam). In view of Montanye, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that admin-
istrative and punitive transfers should be treated alike, but incorrectly held that the
treatment accorded both should include Wolff due process standards. As both
Meachum and Montanye pointed out, Wolff standards apply only when a state-created
liberty interest is at stake. In states where no statutory right to remain in a particular
institution exists, a transfer, whether for punitive or administrative reasons, need not
be preceded by a Wolff hearing.
11 The Fourth Circuit was aware of the pending Meachum and Montanye cases
and accordingly advised the district court on remand to await these decisions. 540 F.2d
at 675.
1a Id. Denson's pro se complaint was apparently so cryptic that the precise facts
could not be discerned.
" Id. at 676.
" The district court had dismissed Denson's complaint without requiring a re-
sponse from the defendants. On remand the Fourth Circuit required the defendants
to answer before the district court proceeded further. Id.
11 See VA. CODE ANN. § 53-210 to 214 (Repl. Vol. 1974); see note 29 supra.
so See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 53-210 to 214 (Repl. Vol. 1974); note 29 supra.
Virginia has no statutes pertaining to prisoner reclassification. In North Carolina,
however, a prisoner can lose accumulated good time credit when reclassified. GEN.
STAT. N.C. § 162-46 (Repl. Vol. 1976); GEN. STAT. N.C. § 14-263 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
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